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It is a fragile polity that is not supported by its members. Acknowledg-
ing this fact, numerous studies have analyzed political support from 
the perspective of citizens (for reviews see Dalton, 2004; Levi & 
Stoker, 2000). However, while we know a lot about the factors that 
affect citizens’ political support, corresponding research on elected 
representatives is lacking. To begin filling this gap in the research, this 
chapter explores various sources of elite democratic satisfaction. Pre-
cisely, we ask how elected representatives evaluate their political sys-
tem, and we take as our indicator of political support the well-
established survey item “satisfaction with democracy”  
(SWD) (Klingeman, 1999; Linde & Ekman, 2001; Anderson, 2002).  
At this early stage of inquiry, we derive our hypotheses from three 
lines of research. The first is the theory of democratic elitism (Prothro 
& Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; see Pefley & Rohrschneider, 2007 
for a review). Democratic elitism theory proceeds from the assumption 
that political (and social) elites function as the guardians of democratic 
values in a given polity. As a consequence of their privileged position, 
and their high level of political sophistication, elites are substantially 
more democratic than the mass public. While the original theory is 
concerned with attitude constraints and commitment to central demo-
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cratic values like “tolerance,” we rely on analogy reasoning to hypoth-
esize that elected representatives are more satisfied with democracy 
than are citizens. A rare previous study on the topic suggests that this 
is indeed the case (Holmberg, 1996). Hence, our first hypothesis – the 
democratic elitism hypothesis (H1) – is that elected representatives, as 
a collective, are more satisfied with democracy than citizens. 
The second line of research of interest to us relates to the literature 
that targets citizen democratic satisfaction. This research shows that 
individual characteristics, as well as the political context, affect how 
citizens assess their political system. Democratic satisfaction is higher 
among citizens who have a university education, who belong to privi-
leged social classes, who are male, and who are supporters of estab-
lished parties in government (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Addition-
ally, previous studies have underscored the importance of political per-
formance and service quality when explaining citizens’ democratic sat-
isfaction (e.g. Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2012). Our second hypothesis – 
the identical sources hypothesis (H2) – asserts that social characteris-
tics, performance evaluations, parliamentary settings (e.g. degree of 
party conflict, type of ruling coalition, influence and political 
knowledge of top leaders, etc.), and individual political factors (such 
as party affiliation and support of the ruling regime), similarly predict 
democratic satisfaction among representatives and the general public.  
The third line of research from which we derive our hypotheses is 
concerned with differences within the collective of elected representa-
tives (e.g. Bowler, Donovan & Karp, 2006). Importantly, Paul 
Sniderman and colleagues (1991; 1996) argue that democratic elitism 
theory overlooks the premise that representatives hold widely different 
beliefs about democracy, and that these beliefs are anchored in their 
political position, and in their ideological values (see also Pefley & 
Rohrschneider, 2007). Similarly, recent surveys of local representatives 
demonstrate that a number of political attitudes are affected by factors 
like experiences in differing parliamentary settings, positions, seniori-
ty, and the quality of citizen encounters (Gilljam, Karlsson, & Sundell, 
2010). Indeed, one study has specifically indicated that the top leaders 
in local politics are less likely than lower-level representatives to sup-
port local elites and more likely to support outsider groups (Karlsson 
& Erikson, 2009). Our third and final hypothesis is therefore the po-
litical experience hypothesis (H3), which states that that experiences of 
privileged positions and political influence have positive effects on rep-
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resentatives’ democratic satisfaction, and, correspondingly, that expe-
riences of relative powerlessness have negative effects.  
Data, design, and modeling strategy 
In order to test our hypotheses we need data that allows us to make 
comparisons between elected representatives and citizens as well as 
comparisons among representatives in varying positions and parlia-
mentary situations. To achieve this, we will rely on three data sources: 
two surveys administered to all local and regional elected representa-
tives in Sweden in 2008 and 2012 (KOLFU) (Gilljam et al., 2011; 
Gilljam & Karlsson, 2013; Gilljam et al., 2010); a survey sent to all 
members of the Swedish parliament in 2010 (The Riksdag Survey) 
(Wängnerud, Esaiasson, Gilljam, & Holmberg, 2010); and two sur-
veys of randomly sampled Swedish citizens (SOM) in 2008 and 2010 
(Holmberg & Weibull, 2009; Holmberg, Weibull, & Oscarsson, 
2011). To allow for systematic evaluations of contextual factors, a 
comparative local government approach will be applied. Precisely, we 
will focus primarily on representatives’ and citizens’ satisfaction with 
local democracy in the 290 municipalities of Sweden.  
In the Swedish national context, a municipality is a complete politi-
cal system with citizens, elections, elected representatives and public 
service responsibilities. In fact, Swedish municipalities have political 
responsibilities that are more extensive than in most non-Scandinavian 
countries (Karlsson & Johansson, 2008; Loughlin, Hendriks & 
Lidström, 2010). About one-third of the personal income in Sweden is 
paid in taxes directly to local and regional government, and municipal-
ities have the possibility to determine the tax rate and the ambition 
level of local public services. Hence, a large part of the political deci-
sions that directly affect the daily life of Swedish citizens are made at 
the municipal level. Consequently, local government is an essential 
part of Swedish democracy, and it is in local politics that citizens are 
most likely to engage in participatory activities between elections.  
In all of the surveys, the question on democratic satisfaction was 
put in the following way: On the whole, how satisfied are you with 
how democracy works: in the EU, in Sweden, in the county coun-
cil/region where you live, and in the municipality where you live. For 
each tier of government four response alternatives were offered: “very 
satisfied,” “rather satisfied,” “rather unsatisfied,” and “not at all sat-
isfied.” For ease of interpretation, we have recoded responses onto a 
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scale ranging from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 100 (very satisfied). The 
mean values on this scale will serve as the measurement of democratic 
satisfaction among the representatives and citizens. 
To test support for the democratic elitism hypothesis (H1) we will 
focus on the differences in democratic satisfaction between representa-
tives and citizens. To test support for the identical sources hypothesis 
(H2), and the political experience hypothesis (H3), we will rely on 
OLS-regressions to identify factors that account for differences among 
representatives and citizens respectively. Four sets of independent vari-
ables will be analyzed:  
1. Individual factors: Previous studies have concluded that individ-
ual characteristics may affect the democratic satisfaction of citizens 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Such factors are obviously not indica-
tors of how the democracy actually works, and effects of individual 
characteristics should rather be interpreted as factors that make indi-
viduals evaluate the same situation differently. In this chapter, five 
individual factors will be used: gender, age, ethnicity, education level 
and social class. These factors have been suggested as important in 
previous studies on democratic satisfaction and/or are associated with 
the political representation of social groups. 
2. Political performance: Previous studies suggest that political per-
formance and the performance of public authorities have effects on 
democratic satisfaction among citizens (e.g. Dahlberg & Holmberg, 
2012). In the analysis, we rely on four indicators to illustrate the 
general condition of the locality (ethnic pluralism, wealth, 
unemployment rate, and tax rate), and four indicators of trends during 
the previous three years (change in refugee immigration levels, 
economic growth, unemployment, and tax rates).  
3. The parliamentary setting: Previous studies have concluded that 
political institutions are important explanations for variations in dem-
ocratic satisfaction among citizens (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). Other 
studies have shown that even though the formal institutions of local 
government are the same within a country, variations in informal insti-
tutional settings have considerable effects on the attitudes of repre-
sentatives (Karlsson, 2013).  
In this analysis, seven indicators relating to the political arena in 
municipalities will be included. The first two relate to the parliamen-
tary situation: type of coalition (measured as dummy variables: over-
sized coalition, minority rule and a minimum winning coalition as the 
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control group); and whether a pariah party has a parliamentary bal-
ance position (specifically if the municipality is ruled by a minority 
which would reach a council majority if it includes the anti-immigrant 
party the Sweden Democrats). Five other indicators, relating to the 
municipal political area, are drawn from the KOLFU-survey data: de-
gree of party conflict, degree of leading representatives’ political 
knowledge, and the degrees of influence of the executive board, the 
mayor, and the administrators. The assessment of conflict, knowledge 
and influence may differ among the members in a council, but their 
common assessment (the mean value of all council members) is a more 
objective indicator of the factual situation.  
4. Individual political factors: The political factors mentioned 
above are all characteristics of the local political arena, but there are 
also political factors that could be tied to individual representatives 
and citizens. One such factor is party affiliation (here measured as 
dummy variables with Social Democrats as the reference category).  
Another important factor, proven in previous research to affect 
democratic satisfaction among citizens, is support for the ruling re-
gime. The literature on the winners and losers in elections has repeat-
edly shown that citizens who vote for the winning side in an election 
are more satisfied with democracy than losers (Blais & Gélineau, 
2007), especially in majoritarian political systems (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997). Another study has found that the negative effect on 
democratic satisfaction from losing an election is reduced among op-
position sympathizers if they have had recent political victories 
(Curini, Jou & Memoli, 2012). That winning or losing an election also 
affects democratic satisfaction among representatives has been shown 
by Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2006). Whether a representative is a 
member of the winning, ruling majority or the losing opposition does 
also affect other attitudes towards democracy (Gilljam & Karlsson, 
2012; Gilljam, Persson & Karlsson, 2012). In this study, the win/loss-
factor is measured by a variable based on the respondents’ party affili-
ation. A political representative can be a member of the ruling majori-
ty or the opposition in the local council, while a citizen can be a sup-
porter of a party in the local ruling majority or of a party in opposi-
tion.  
So far, all variables under discussion are potentially relevant for 
both representatives and citizens. To specifically test the political expe-
rience hypothesis (H3), we focus on factors relating to the unique ex-
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periences of being elected to office. We hypothesize that the following 
factors will affect satisfaction with democracy among representatives: 
seniority (measured as the number of years in political office); political 
position (measured by whether the representative is a top leader – 
which we define as being chair of the council, executive board or 
council committee – or whether the representative is a member of the 
executive board). Finally, we expect that conflictual interactions with 
citizens will undermine democratic satisfaction among representatives 
(our measure is self-reported in the KOLFU-survey and shows whether 
the individual representative was threatened or harassed by citizens at 
least once in the past twelve months).  
General and tier-specific democratic satisfaction 
Practically all democracies in the world are organized in a multilevel 
government system. In the case of Sweden, there are four tiers: the EU, 
the state, the county/region and the municipality. Elected representatives 
at each tier are chosen in separate elections, and each tier is responsible 
for different kinds of public services. Even if politics at the four tiers of 
government are to some extent intertwined, each tier has its own dis-
tinct democratic processes for making political decisions. Over time, 
Swedish citizens have made different assessments of how democracy 
works at different tiers, and normally, citizens are most satisfied with 
national democracy, followed by democracy at the local and regional 
levels. Swedes have always been least satisfied with democracy at the 
EU-level (e.g. Holmberg & Weibull, 2005).  
However, while a citizen is a citizen of all four tiers, representatives 
are strongly associated with the particular tier of government where 
they are elected. As representatives have specific experiences and re-
sponsibilities at one particular tier, they could be expected to perceive 
distinctions in democracy among the different tiers. Citizens, on the 
other hand, have less motivation, and are perhaps generally less 
equipped, to make clear distinctions between the tiers of government. 
Therefore, citizens can be expected to make a general assessment on 
how democracy works across the various tiers of government. Previous 
studies have shown that the local authorities’ service performance pre-
dicts citizen satisfaction with democracy on the national level (Weitz-
Shapiro, 2008). If these assumptions are correct, we would expect gen-
eral democratic satisfaction to be a better predictor of tier-specific dem-
ocratic satisfaction among citizens than among representatives.  
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The main dependent variable in our analysis is satisfaction with local 
democracy. Preliminary results indicate that both representatives’ and 
citizens’ democratic satisfaction, at a specific tier of government, to a 
considerable extent is influenced by their general assessment of democ-
racy for the whole, multilevel government system. This general factor 
could potentially be so strong that the local factors included in our 
models would not significantly influence attitudes towards local democ-
racy at all. Therefore, we will use the respondents’ democratic satisfac-
tion at the national level as an indicator of general satisfaction when 
analyzing democratic satisfaction at the local level.  
The democratic elitism hypothesis (H1): Are representatives more 
satisfied with democracy than citizens?  
We can determine the differences in democratic satisfaction between 
elected representatives and citizens by comparing survey responses 
relating to the democracy at the EU, the national, the regional and the 
local tiers of government. In these comparisons we are also able to 
compare the democratic satisfaction of all elected representatives at 
the national, the regional and the local levels in Sweden. The results 
from this comparison are presented in Figure 1.  
In support of the democratic elitism hypothesis, elected representa-
tives report a higher level of satisfaction with democracy than citizens 
in the three tiers of government within Sweden; the only exception 
being satisfaction with regional democracy, where citizens are about as 
satisfied as local councilors. In absolute terms, the differences between 
the citizens’ degree of democratic satisfaction, and the category of rep-
resentatives that scores the highest, are 8-11 points on the 0-100 scale.  
However, a result clearly in conflict with our expectations concerns as-
sessments on how democracy works in the EU. In this case, representa-
tives in all three tiers of government are less satisfied than citizens. Citi-
zens are 7-11 points more satisfied with EU democracy than the repre-
sentatives.  
Then, are elected representatives more satisfied with democracy on 
the tier of government where they have been elected and less satisfied 
with the tiers where they are not active? 
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Figure 1.  Democratic satisfaction (0-100) of representatives and citizens at 
the EU, national, regional and local tiers of government.  
 
 
Comments: The figure illustrates the degree of democratic satisfaction at four different 
tiers of government (mean value 0-100) for members of the national parliament (2010, 
N=309), county and local councilors (2012, N= 1,215 and 9,186) and citizens (2010, 
N=4,767). 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.  
 
This assumption has some support as members of the national parlia-
ment are the representatives most satisfied with democracy at the na-
tional level and county councilors are the representatives most satisfied 
with democracy at the regional level. However, national representa-
tives are somewhat more satisfied with local democracy than local 
councilors. 
The conclusions so far are that while the democratic elitism hypothe-
sis receives some support, the differences between citizens and repre-
sentatives are modest, and the results on EU democracy are in conflict 
with expectations. This latter result is especially surprising since Swe-
dish elected representatives are traditionally seen as being more support-
ive of the EU than citizens. An interpretation in favour of the democrat-
ic elitism hypothesis is that the representatives in our study differ be-
tween the EU on the one hand and the three tiers within Sweden on the 
other, and their “elitist system support” only relates to the latter.  
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Generally, members of the national parliament show the highest de-
gree of democratic satisfaction and local councilors the lowest. This 
difference between representative categories does not support the idea 
that the representatives are a uniform elite, but rather that there are de-
grees of elitism. The professional, national politicians are the elite of the 
elite and the local councilors, who in most cases are layman politicians, 
are closer to the citizens.  
The identical sources hypothesis (H2): Do representatives and citizens 
rely on the same sources of democratic satisfaction? 
When testing support for our second hypothesis, the dependent varia-
ble is satisfaction with democracy at the local level (“in the municipali-
ty where you live”). The determinants at the system level (factors relat-
ing to political performance and parliamentary settings) relate to the 
situation in each municipality. We use OLS-regression to estimate two 
models for citizens and local representatives respectively, where Model 
2 includes a control for general democratic satisfaction (as measured by 
SWD at the national level). The results are presented in Table 1. The 
results in Table 1 show that factors relating to parliamentary settings 
affect representatives to a higher degree than they affect citizens. Two 
factors have similar effects on both groups: party conflict is negatively 
associated with democratic satisfaction and political knowledge 
among leading representatives is positively associated with democratic 
satisfaction. Three factors have significant effects only among repre-
sentatives: A strong mayor decreases democratic satisfaction; strong 
administrators increases satisfaction; and an oversized ruling coalition 
decreases democratic satisfaction.  
The two most important determinants of democratic satisfaction are 
support of the ruling majority and party affiliation. Among representa-
tives, the effect of representing a majority party is 19 points on the 0-
100 scale. Even though we did expected this result (c.f. Bowler et al., 
2006), the size of the effect is surprisingly large. The corresponding ef-
fect among citizens is smaller (4 points) but it is still one of the most 
important determinants in this group. 
Turning to party affiliation, supporters and members of the Social 
Democrats and the Left Party are the most satisfied with local democra-
cy while supporters and members of local parties are the least satisfied. 
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Figure 1:  Democratic satisfaction (0-100) of representatives and citizens at 
the EU, national, regional and local tiers of government.  
 
 
Comments: The figure illustrates the degree of democratic satisfaction at four different 
tiers of government (mean value 0-100) for members of the national parliament (2010, 
N=309), county and local councilors (2012, N= 1,215 and 9,186) and citizens (2010, 
N=4,767). 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.  
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other, and their “elitist system support” only relates to the latter.  
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Table 1.  Determinants of democratic satisfaction among citizens and local 
elected representatives in 2008 (OLS-regression, b-values) 
 Citizens Local representatives 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 47.1 13.9 35.0* 2.6 
General satisfaction      
Satisfaction with national democracy (0-100)  NI 0.5*** NI 0.5*** 
     Individual factors     
Gender ( female = 1) -0.5 0.4 -2.9*** -1.2* 
Age: Young (-29 =1) 5.3*** 3.4** 0.3 -1.1 
Age: Old (65+ =1) (Control group:30-64) 2.2 2.6** 2.6*** 2.8*** 
Ethnicity (immigrant = 1) 0.6 0.8 -4.4*** -4.0*** 
Education (high = 1) 2.6** 0.4 -0.2 -0.7 
Social class (worker = 1) -1.8 1.1 1.4 2.2** 
     Political performance     
Unemployment rate, 2008 (percent) -1.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 
Unemployment rate, 2005-08 (relative change) -0.4 -1.1 -0.4 -0.5 
Tax rate, 2008 (percent) -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 
Tax rate, 2005-08 (relative change) -6.5* -3.6 0.6 0.7 
Wealth (mean income, 2008, 1000 SEK) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Economic Growth, 2005-08 (percent) 0.4 0.2 0.5*** 0.3* 
Ethnic pluralism (percent foreign born, 2006) 0.1 0.0 0.1* 0.1 
Refugee immigration, 2005-08 (arriving refu-
gees per 10,000 inhabitants) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     Parliamentary settings     
Type of coalition A: Minority rule = 1 -0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 
Type of coalition B: Oversized coalition = 1  
(Control group: MWC.) 
0.0 0.2 -2.0** -1.4* 
Pariah party in balance position = 1 0.1 -1.3 0.1 0.8 
Degree of party conflict (0-10) -1.0* -0.9** -1.6*** -1.8*** 
Political knowledge of executive board (0-10) 3.8** 3.6*** 6.8*** 5.6*** 
Influence: Strong executive board (0-10) 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.1 
Influence: Strong mayor (0-10) -0.7 -0.9 -3.0*** -2.8*** 
Influence: Strong administrators (0-10) -1.5 -0.4 1.1 1.1* 
     Individual political factors     
Party: Left party =1 -3.8 0.1 -7.9*** -2.9** 
Party: Green party =1 -2.6 -2.8 -12.6*** -7.6*** 
Party: Centre party =1 2.0 -0.7 -3.2*** -4.0*** 
Party: Liberal party =1 -1.4 -4.7** -6.4*** -8.2*** 
Party: Christian democrats =1 -2.1 -3.0 -6.1*** -7.0*** 
Party: Moderate party =1 -1.3 -4.0*** -3.8*** -6.5*** 
Party: Sweden democrats =1 -10.6*** -2.5 -22.6*** -5.7* 
Party: Others/unaffiliated =1  
(Control group: Social democrats) 
-16.3*** -8.8** -15.7*** -10.4*** 
Supporting the ruling majority =1 5.0*** 4.4*** 19.1*** 18.6*** 
Adj. R2 .06 .30 .22 .34 
 
Comments: Data sources are Riks-SOM, 2008 (for citizens, N=2,734) and KOLFU, 2008 
(for local elected representatives, N=7,849). A test for collinearity shows that the unem-
ployment indicators (year 2008 and the change from 2005-08) are strongly intercorrelated. 
However, the two indicators remain in the models as further controls show that neither of 
the two have a significant effect when the other is excluded, and an exclusion of one indi-
cator does not significantly affect the effects of any other variable in the analysis. NI = 
variable not included, p-values: * <.05; **<.01; ***<.001.  
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The local parties are often founded as populist protest organizations 
against the local elites (c.f. Wörlund, 1999), and it is not surprising 
that supporters and organizations of such parties are unsatisfied with 
local democracy. The difference between those affiliated with the most 
and least satisfied party is only slightly larger among representatives 
than among citizens. The differences between supporters of different 
parties are generally larger when democratic satisfaction at the nation-
al level is the dependent variable.1 Controlling for general satisfaction 
and support/opposition of the local ruling majority, the party effects 
on local democratic satisfaction are substantially weaker.  
Furthermore, the results of Table 1 show that variables relating to 
individual characteristics and political performance affect both citizens 
and representatives, but to a much lesser extent than political factors. 
In both groups, people over the age of 65 are significantly more satis-
fied than others. And citizens under 30 are also more satisfied than 
middle-aged citizens (this youthful satisfaction is not mirrored among 
representatives). Female and immigrant representatives are less satis-
fied with local democracy than male and native representatives, but 
these effects are not mirrored among citizens.2 
Performance factors have surprisingly weak effects on democratic 
satisfaction among both citizens and representatives. The only signifi-
cant determinant on local democratic satisfaction is a changed tax 
rate, showing that raised taxes lower satisfaction. But this effect is no 
longer significant when controlling for general satisfaction.3 Among 
representatives, economic growth in the locality seems to be the only 
factor that increases local democratic satisfaction. 
 
1 In an analysis where national democratic satisfaction is the dependent variable, Sweden Demo-
crats are the most dissatisfied while supporters and representatives of the parties included in the 
national government are the most satisfied. This result is valid both among citizens and among 
representatives, and validates the position of the Sweden Democrats as the most anti-
establishment oriented party at the national level. The result also maintains the role of the politi-
cal winner-loser factor in general. 
2 A control analysis shows that traditional explanations of democratic satisfaction among citi-
zens, such as education and social class, show the expected effects on democratic satisfaction at 
the national level, but there are no separate effects of these factors on local democratic satisfac-
tion when controlling for general satisfaction. This indicates that these factors may have an effect 
on local democratic satisfaction, but only indirectly via general satisfaction.  
3 A follow-up analysis shows that the negative effect of raised taxes is substantial and significant 
among citizens supporting opposition parties, while the local democratic satisfaction of support-
ers of the local ruling majority is not at all affected.  
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The overall result of Table 1 is that the identical sources hypothesis 
receives support. The main impression is that the factors that affect 
democratic satisfaction among representatives are basically those af-
fecting citizens. In no case does a factor show opposite effects among 
representatives compared to among citizens. Even the effect of general 
democratic satisfaction is identical among representatives and citizens. 
This is surprising since we expected representatives to make more crys-
talized evaluations of the democracy at different tiers of government. 
However, the results also show that the factors included in the model 
generally have stronger effects on representatives than on citizens, es-
pecially the political factors.  
The political experience hypothesis (H3): Does the experience of 
political office affect democratic satisfaction among representatives? 
In the final step, we add the representatives’ unique experiences of po-
litical office to the analysis: seniority, formal position within the polit-
ical hierarchy, and the experiences of citizen interaction. Because being 
in majority or in opposition is a major divide, the analysis also tests 
whether effects of these experiences differ depending on representa-
tives’ parliamentary position.  
All models in Table 2 below estimate the additional effects of expe-
rience-based factors while controlling for the variables in Model 2 
above. The effects among all representatives are analyzed in Model 3, 
while Models 4 and 5 focus on representatives in majority and in op-
position, respectively.  
The results confirm the expectation that representatives’ democratic 
satisfaction is affected by their experience in political office. A general 
finding is that representatives in privileged positions (top leaders and 
members of the executive board) are more satisfied with democracy 
than backbenchers. The results also indicate that seniority increases 
democratic satisfaction among representatives. It is perhaps not sur-
prising that those who have personally benefitted from the rules and 
practices of an established system are more satisfied with how the sys-
tem works than the system’s “losers.” The effect of seniority could 
also be interpreted as another example of this “privilege effect”, since 
senior representatives informally have a leadership role in the political 
hierarchy, independent of their formal position. However, the seniori-
ty effect might also be a result of self-selection, that is: unsatisfied rep-
resentatives leave politics while the content representatives stay on. 
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Table 2.  Effects of parliamentary settings and experience of political office 
on representatives’ local democratic satisfaction, results by 
majority and opposition (OLS-regression, b-values) 
 All represen-
tatives 
Majority 
parties 
Opposition 
parties 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
General satisfaction, individual and economic 
factors, party affiliation 
CF CF CF 
Type of rule: minority =1  0.3 -2.2 2.9 
Type of rule: oversized =1 (Control group: MWC) -1.4* -1.3 -2.9** 
Type of rule: pariah party in balance position =1 0.4 3.0 -1.1 
Degree of political conflict (0-10) -1.7*** -0.7*** -3.1*** 
Political knowledge: Executive board (0-10) 5.6*** 4.6*** 6.8*** 
Political power: Executive board (0-10) 0.4 -1.5 2.4 
Political power: Mayor (0-10) -2.9*** 1.4* -7.0*** 
Political power: Administrators (0-10) 1.0 0.5 2.1* 
Seniority, years in political office  0.1*** 0.1 0.2*** 
Top leader (chair of council, board, committee =1) 3.9*** 3.6*** 17.0*** 
Member of executive board =1 2.1*** 2.2*** 2.4** 
Threats (threatened at least once the past 12 
months =1) 
-4.4*** -2.4* -6.8*** 
Members of the ruling majority =1 17.6*** NI NI 
Adj. R2 .35 .24 .26 
 
Comments: Data source is KOLFU, 2008 (Model A: N=7,849, Model B N=4,249, Model C 
N=3,450). In all models, local democratic satisfaction (0-100) is the dependent variable. 
CF = controlled for, NI = not included. P-values: * <.05, **<.01, ***<.001.  
 
Another result in Table 2 is that representatives who have recently 
been threatened or harassed by citizens are less satisfied with democ-
racy than their colleagues. The fact that representatives, when evaluat-
ing their political system, weigh citizen encounters, further underlines 
the result that personal experiences affect satisfaction with democracy. 
Perhaps the most important result in Table 2 is that several factors 
affect majority representatives and opposition representatives differ-
ently (Models 4 and 5). This suggests that political strategy significant-
ly affects the judgment of representatives. The ruling majority and the 
opposition are two political counterparts that have different political 
goals: The ruling majority wants to secure its privileged position and 
the opposition wants to replace the majority, or at least to make its 
rule unsuccessful. If a political factor has different impacts on demo-
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opposition are two political counterparts that have different political 
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cratic satisfaction among majority and opposition representatives, the 
assessments are likely to be affected by strategic calculations in rela-
tion to these goals. 
This is most notable in the way majority and opposition representa-
tives are affected by the political strength of the mayor (i.e. the chair 
of the executive board). A strong mayor makes majority representa-
tives more satisfied with local democracy and opposition representa-
tives more dissatisfied. A strong mayor is an important asset for the 
majority and a disadvantage for the opposition. The individualized 
leadership of the majority’s leader reduces the relative influence of the 
collective bodies where the opposition is present (i.e. the council and 
the executive board) and possibly affects their chances to do well in 
coming elections.  
Above we saw that influential administrators affect democratic sat-
isfaction positively, which was a bit surprising. One would perhaps 
expect that politicians saw it as a democratic problem if administra-
tors – and not elected representatives like themselves – had political 
power. However, the results of Table 2 reveal that the positive effect is 
only significant on the opposition side of the aisle. Perhaps the opposi-
tion views a strong bureaucracy as an ally against the majority, or at 
least an impediment for the ruling majority which the opposition ap-
preciates.  
Furthermore, the results of Table 2 show that oversized ruling coa-
litions – which earlier was identified as a negative factor for represent-
atives’ democratic satisfaction – in fact only have a negative effect 
among opposition representatives. In a situation where more parties 
than necessary have been included in the ruling majority, those who in 
the end were left out are especially unhappy and marginalized.  
The degree of party conflict is a negative factor for democratic sat-
isfaction on both sides of the aisle, but to a higher degree among op-
position representatives. A culture of party conflict is often a result of 
the relationship between the majority and the opposition going sour. 
And when the relations are hostile, opposition members are likely 
weakened and hence more discontent.  
Top leaders are rare among opposition representatives, as such po-
sitions are generally assigned to majority members. However, there are 
exceptions and the few top leaders who are in the opposition are much 
more satisfied with democracy than other opposition representatives. 
Additionally, the top leader effect is much stronger among opposition 
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than majority representatives. Seniority, i.e. the number of years a rep-
resentative has held political office, is a positive factor for democratic 
satisfaction among opposition representatives, but not significantly so 
among majority representatives. As most formal top leader positions 
are awarded to majority representatives, perhaps informal hierarchy 
factors are more important among opposition representatives.  
Conclusions: Elitism and political strategy 
This chapter evaluates support for three broad hypotheses. The demo-
cratic elitism hypothesis predicts that elected representatives, as de-
fenders of the system, will be more satisfied with democracy than citi-
zens. In this study, we have found that even though representatives are 
generally more satisfied with democracy than citizens, the differences 
between the two are relatively small and in one case (attitudes towards 
democracy at the EU-level) citizens are more satisfied than are repre-
sentatives. The hypothesis is thus only partly confirmed.  
Other results in the chapter add to the elitism theory. Elected repre-
sentatives are not a coherent group when it comes to system support, 
and a general pattern seems to be that there are grades of elitism: 
privileged representatives are more satisfied than less privileged; pro-
fessional representatives at the national level are more satisfied than 
laymen representatives at the local level; majority representatives are 
more satisfied than opposition representatives; senior representatives 
are more satisfied than junior representatives; and representatives with 
higher positions within the political hierarchy are more satisfied than 
backbenchers. All of these results support the democratic elitism theo-
ry if we recognize that there are elites within the elite.  
Our second hypothesis was that representatives and citizens evalu-
ate the political system through similar sources. This hypothesis was 
generally supported, as most factors that affected representatives also 
affected citizens in a similar way. But we also noted that representa-
tives were affected by more factors, especially those relating to local 
parliamentary settings. However, the fact that elected representatives 
are more affected by political factors than citizens does not mean that 
citizens are unaffected. The factors that influence democratic satisfac-
tion among both representatives and citizens are membership/support 
of the ruling party, party affiliation, the degree of party conflict, and 
the competence of political leaders. 
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privileged representatives are more satisfied than less privileged; pro-
fessional representatives at the national level are more satisfied than 
laymen representatives at the local level; majority representatives are 
more satisfied than opposition representatives; senior representatives 
are more satisfied than junior representatives; and representatives with 
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generally supported, as most factors that affected representatives also 
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tives were affected by more factors, especially those relating to local 
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The unique experiences of representatives were the focus of our 
third hypothesis, which stated that such experiences would explain 
variation in democratic satisfaction among representatives. This hy-
pothesis was clearly confirmed. As mentioned above, seniority and 
formal positions affect the degree of satisfaction. We also found that 
threats and harassment from citizens negatively affect the democratic 
satisfaction of the representative victim.  
Perhaps the most important result of the analysis was the discovery 
of party political strategy as an explanation of democratic satisfaction 
among representatives. It was expected that majority representatives 
would be more satisfied with democracy than opposition representa-
tives, but the difference we found was large and remarkably consistent 
across indicators.  
Our major findings on the elitism factor and the importance of po-
litical strategy are illustrated in Figure 2, where the diverging levels of 
democratic satisfaction between majority and opposition support-
ers/members, among citizens and local elected representatives, are 
compared.  
Figure 2.      Democratic satisfaction among representatives and citizens by
tives) political position. Predicted mean values. 
support/membership of local ruling majority and (among representa-
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that representatives are more satisfied with their 
democratic system than citizens, but it also qualifies this result by 
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showing the important implications of political self-interest. In fact, 
the difference between majority and opposition representatives is larg-
er than the difference between representatives and citizens. Further-
more, the levels of democratic satisfaction among citizens who support 
the local opposition, and representatives who are opposition back-
benchers, are almost the same, and hence opposition representatives 
are less satisfied than citizens who support parties in the ruling the 
majority. We might also see some signs of co-optation among opposi-
tion members, where opposition representatives with top leadership 
positions are almost as satisfied with democracy as majority members 
without such positions. Being in opposition does decrease a repre-
sentative’s democratic satisfaction considerably, but the negative effect 
of being in an outsider position could to a high degree be compensated 
by promotion into high political offices. The opposition backbenchers 
are the least satisfied of all, and it may be that this group is extra sen-
sitive to further political humiliation.  
When the effect of factors relating to parliamentary settings on ma-
jority and opposition representatives was compared, the strategic di-
mension became even more apparent. Some of the differences between 
majority and opposition representatives could only be interpreted in 
the light of their different roles and differing political self-interest due 
to parliamentary position. Opposition members generally face an up-
hill battle when trying to influence policy decisions. Our results indi-
cate that the presence of a strong mayor adds to the opposition’s trou-
bles, while strong administrators might serve as allies. A high degree of 
political conflict is possibly a result of the ruling majority’s intention 
to keep their political opposition at bay. 
The theory of democratic elitism builds on a view that the respon-
sibilities of political office ennoble the representatives into supporting 
important democratic values. Political strategy on the other hand is a 
political self-interest-based explanation where representatives’ views 
on the political system are coloured by their ambition to keep or attain 
political power.  
Determining which of the two explanations is most valid must be a 
task for future research. But awaiting this research we can conclude 
that irrespective of what their actual incentives are, the political elite 
are more supportive of the democratic system than citizens, and most 
supportive of all are the elites within the elite.  
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